k. rodman mannix

Book Notes: The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916

2020-03-29

This is one of those books where it seems like every sentence had two nuggets of information woven in. The book is slathered with details in an effort not to just listlessly regurgitate actions taken but provide the proper backdrop against which decisions were made. It’s one of those books where it seems like you do more note taking than reading, alternatively flipping back and forth between the page and the pen.

This is not an introductory book. It expects the reader to have intermediate prior knowledge of the war. Sir John French, commander of the British Expeditionary Force in that dreadful 1914 fall, was referenced without an introduction. Gallipoli is described as brilliantly conceptualized without itself being described first. As the reader wades further into the pages, political and minor military characters are discussed, leaving the reader to do some investigation independently. Wikipedia and overall having an internet-equipped mobile device was quite helpful.

I learned much about Verdun I did not know previously. Prior to this book, I knew of Verdun to be a horrible battle, but not sure of the specifics why. I learned how it has seeped into the military spirit of France and to a lesser degree Germany. I learned how it informed decisions for the next terrible war, of the Maginot line and the renewed focus on the defensive, in complete contrast to spirit of the offensive of France in WWI. I look forward to reading the other two books in the Trilogy of the Franco-German rivalry from 1870 to 1940.

• la Debacle
  • A small initial German force was at Verdun, only 9 divisions. However, it led to the longest battle of all-time, a battle in which 75% of the French Army was rotated through, and had the densest dead per square yard that had probably ever been known
  • The transition to total war was ushered in by the Franco-Prussian war, with conscription and sieges on civilians and heavy reparations
  • After their defeat in 1870, France doubletimed paying off repression’s and reorganizing the army. Young soldiers who had witnessed Sedan rose in ranks to start military schools, analyze the faults of 1870, and form the GQG. Conscription was enacted for 5 years of service, new rifling was equipped, and new defenses along the border were constructed, no as single fortified cities but complex systems spanning great lengths
  • France was able to participate in the colonization races, grabbing up many territories that would prove valuable in WW1.
  • Even with its recent defeat, France was still the center of western culture and its people enjoyed a great life. It was sometimes easy to forget the embarrassment of 1870
  • The Dreyfus Affair caused great upheaval in the military and in general across France, effectively relegating military promotions to a faith-based matter
  • The Agadir crisis of 1911 galvanized both France and Germany into a military fervor. France had not felt more united in its patriotism since Napoleon. A slow transition toward the offensive away from the more defensive posture occurred as 1870 retracted more and more into the past
  • De Grandmaison, chief of operations for the General Staff, was largely responsible for the culture of “attaque a outrace” and “elan vital”
    • This led to slight ignorance of heavy, more immobile yet powerful weaponry such as airplanes and heavy artillery
    • With the thought being that France would always be on the offensive, the army had plenty of German maps but none of France at the onset of the war
  • Horne blames Moltke for the failure of Schlieffen’s plan, attributing his “faint-heartedness” as the reason for not bolstering the right wing enough and making ill-advised decisions
  • The Germans were hamstrung by the removal of Bismark, the Kaiser’s sycophants, and the caste-like system preventing meritocratic promotion. However, they were equipped with an expansive reserve system and an overwhelming advantage in weapons
• Joffre of the Marne
  • “Splendid cuirassiers in glittering breastplates of another age hurled their horses hopelessly at the machine guns that were slaughtering the infantry. It was horrible, and horribly predictable. In that superb, insane courage or 1914 there was something slightly reminiscent of the lemmings swimming out to sea. But it was not war.” France brought a 19th century army to a 20th century fight.
  • Out of the miracle of the Marne, with von Kluck turning his flank to Paris in an ill-advised move and Gallieni recognizing the chance to stop the German swinging door, rose Joffre to prominence, replacing in the people’s minds the symbolic spot that was once held by the government which had fled to Bordeaux
  • Two ways to explain Joffre: his humongous belly and appetite, and his taciturnity
  • “To sum up on Joffre, it might be said that the war was very nearly lost with him, but that it would almost certainly have been lost without him.”
• Falkenhayn
  • At the end of 1915, a year of frozen lines and disasters in the East by the Allies due to the impotence of Russia, Joffre was as close to being the Allied de facto commander as Foch would be later with the disposal of the Russian military leader and Sir John French incoming. There was a plan for a spring offensive in 1916 once enough ammunition and resources had been piled up
  • Falkenhayn did not seem to have any remarkable qualities, but came to the attention of the Kaiser after his dealings with the Boxer Rebellion and German interests in China. He worked under General von Prittwitz before the war (who’s panicky ways during the beginning of the war would almost wrought disaster for the Germans), and usurped his commander with efficiency and control. He was appointed Minister of War and assumed Moltke’s position after the Marne, giving him a wide range of power other military commanders of the war did not have. As the author puts it, his rise was “meteoric”
  • Falkenhayn, while determined, hard-working, and efficient, yet was often too prudent and indecisive. This suited more a general trying to not lose a war than a general trying to win one. He also groomed a lonely existence, preferring to be in solitary.
  • Falkenhayn was a “Westerner” - he believed the western front was where the war could be won, and wrote to the Kaiser that Britain was the main threat to Germany. It had a large reserve of men, could stockpile reserves faster, and that it would leave no mercy for Germany. He saw France, Russia and allies as mere weapons in a England’s hand. Surmising that Russia would not last long due to internal strife and that Italy was a sideshow along with other allies, Falkenhayn thought that removing the will from France to fight would be the only way to incentivize Britain to no longer meddle on the continent.
  • This partially played into the Kaisers insecurities regarding Britain. By framing it as a way to undermine and retaliate effectively against his cousins, Falkenhayn essentially assured acceptance of the thesis by the Kaiser. Additionally, by choosing Verdun the Kaiser’s own son would be leading some of the forces
  • This resulted in Verdun, a plan to bled the French white. Verdun was a salient into German mines, and of importance to the French morale.
  • Falkenhayn mislead his commanders, calculating that if they knew the intent was a long war of attrition, they wouldn’t fight as hard or with as much purpose. So, he stated the intent as the capture of verdun, but held back some strategic resources such as troops to hinder the chance to capture the fort quickly.
  • “Seldom in the history of war can the commander of a great army have been so cynically deceived as was the German Crown Prince by Falkenhayn”
• Operation Gericht
  • Gericht means judgement, or sometimes place of execution
  • The German efficiency was not absent in preparation for Verdun, with supply lines being built and massive guns brought in; for an area of 8 miles, 1,220 pieces of artillery were available.
  • Six days of ammunition had been stocked for the initial onslaught, so that all points of attack would be continuously bombarded
  • Camouflage and secrecy was taken seriously, with operations done at night, commanders of other forces not informed of the attack, German agents in neutral countries spreading misinformation that this was a feint
  • It was here that the concrete Stollen, or underground galleries, was effectively used to house troops rather that pack them in the forward trenches
  • The Germans amass a large Air Force consisting of 168 planes along with balloons and zeppelins, the biggest in the history of the world to this point, that would provide dawn to dusk aerial barrages
  • Verdun was the birthplace of the nation of Germany in 843, when the Treaty of Verdun split Europe across the three heirs of Charlemagne. It was taken over by Germans in 923, the liberated in 1552 by France. Each century over the last 3 or 4 it had been bombarded. During the war, it was quite peaceful, with many remarking it had a pre-war feel behind the lines. It was the strongest fortress on earth, with natural barriers and defensive positions.
  • However, reinforcement of fortresses was not in keeping with the French spirit of the offensive, so after the failures of the Belgian and French forts in 1914, Verdun and other forts were seen as a relic of a past strategy, not to be invested in and to have their resources diverted to other objectives
  • Emile Driant, son-in-law of Boulanger, was an older, experienced lieutenant-colonel manning the center of the Verdun first line, which was where any direct assault on the fortress would take place. Finding himself short handed with forces, he pleaded through political connections for reinforcements, circumventing the military chain of command. This infuriated Joffre, and may have led to spitefully not assigning resources there prior to attack.
  • The attack was scheduled for the 12th, but snowy weather prevailed
• The Waiting Machine
  • Tensions were high as soldiers on both side anticipated a fight
  • A Germany Army Corp consisted of two infantry divisions, a divisions of two brigades; a brigade of two regiments, a regiment of two to three battalions of about 1000 men each.
  • French soldiers and the Army in general were mostly behind the British and Germans in medicine, trenches, and care from their officers. In the spirit of offensive, French medical workers were expecting and trained for an aseptic war with clean bullet holes, not the crude sheets of metal from shells. There was also much separation between officers and soldiers, in which soldiers would not be exaggerating to fee ignored by the officers once military action was complete
  • The fortitude of these 19th century men may be attributed to the heard-working labor class that filled the ranks. It also spoke to the expectations of classes, that those who would be foot soldiers were not expected or even thought of to speak up against bad leadership or horrible conditions brought forth by the officer, or upper, class. By 1916, he simply fought out of a helpless sense of habit to keep going and keep alive.
• The First Day
  • Each part of the Verdun area was heavily bombarded, smashing trees and transforming the area beyond anything recognizable. The bombardment started around 6a. At around 8a it paused, which was usually a sign of a coming attack. Instead, the French exposed their positions in preparation of defense and revealed their locations to the Germans.
  • The Germans sent out patrols after the bombardment around 4p, to trickle like water into lightly defended areas that had been destroyed by the bombardment
  • The flamethrower was used for the first time as the Germans invaded the front line trenches of some areas
  • For all the bombardment carnage, the French line still held. Because of Falkenhayn’s relicatance to fully engage the attack on the heels of the bombardment, an opportunity was lost to capture some positions and make substantial forward progress. However, some cracks in the French line began to show
  • Bois d’Haumont was taken
• The Fall of Colonel Driant
  • Von Zwehl’s Westphalian corps captured Haumont
  • Lt-col Bonviolle planned to counter attack to take Bois d’Haumont, but it soon became clear his troops would be needed to hold onto the town of Haumont
  • On the second day, the morning again brought a “softening up” barrage intended to break any French defense along the farthest parts of the eastern side of the Meuse.
  • The German Army slowly and methodically took over the areas surrounding Bois des Caures, which Driant and his commanders such as Stephane were defending. Artillery was fired at them from behind, and they began to coalesce in centered, farther back trenches from trenches more forward and on the side. They were eventually surrounded and killed heroically. But, they prevented most of the Crown Prince’s forces from reaching their objectives, slowing the German march on Verdun
• Breakthrough
  • General Bapst was elderly at 60 and had spent much of his career in peace artillery depots. He was a bit shaken up by the chaos of the 21st and 22nd
  • The stronghold Brabant along the Meuse was threatened by the capture of Haumont with encirclement. After receiving Carte Blanche from his commander General Chretien, Bapst ordered a retreat. But then, Chretien heard reports of reinforcements and told Bapst to reoccupy it. But, at the end, there was no a troop to spare and von Zwehl’s men took it. Historians called this the first of the major tactical blunders of Verdun.
  • With disorganized counter attacks at less than full strength, the French were still able to slow the German attacks on the third day, and there was no breakthrough. The spirited defense of Herbebois and Beaumont, in which French machine gunners fought to the death, became an anchor to hold the Beaumont-Samogneux line by the 72nd division
  • Miscommunication about whether Samogneux was captured wrought disaster for the French. It was indeed still held, but artillery fire was ordered with the intent to drive back capturing Germans, essentially clearing out the French in the city
  • On the 24th, the line broke. With the 72nd decimated, and 4 days of heavy bombardment, the reserve 37th African Division was plugged in like clay onto a dam in piecemeal fashion and under command of unfamiliar officers. The advancing Germans encountered little resistance, and advanced as much as the first three days put together
  • There were no reserve units. General Balfourier relieved Chretien, but his Corp was still in route, marching in the cold without food for a day. They would need to rest before use
• Fort Douaumont
  • On paper, Fort Douaumont was the strongest fort in the world and was the lynchpin of the whole Verdun line. It had an incredibly complex and sophisticated set of defenses both inside and outside the fort.
  • Due to a combination of Joffre’s deemphasis of first in 1915, an administrative boundary about who commanded the fort, and miscommunication between the new commander Balfourier and old commander Chretien, the fort was largely unoccupied with only gunners manning the artillery. Additionally, the Germans were able to move into the fort with ease because the commander was below ground to avoid the barrage, not aware the extent of the German advance, and neighboring French squads though that the Germans entering the fort were actually French
  • This is a great chapter
  • Von Brandis was the last to enter Douaumont before it was officially capture. But, because Haupt requested Brandis to give the account back to HQ, the became the most famous from the event (not without a bit of his own embellishment).
• De Castelnau Decides
  • Gloomy news reached Joffre via De Castelnau, and in Joffre’s usual flippancy he allow De Castelnau to visit Verdun and make necessary changes. Castelnau had commanded the Second Army at the outbreak of war. He was a stern follower of the attack that permeated French military strategy, but was smart and quick-witted and could adapt.
  • De Castelnau spring into action, ordering Petain and his Second Army to come to defend both the right and left bank. He sought to quietly replace General Herr with Petain. He formulated defenses, inspired morale, and assembled the forces necessary to hold the right bank.
  • This played right into Falkenhayn‘s plans to make this a meat grinder. Military critics can argue that de Castelnau should have fallen back, that he should have gave a little to provide for a defensive advantage. But summing up the mantra of de Castelnau’s theories of war and the morale of the French solider, it is not certain that a retreat would not return into a rout and that giving up land would’ve achieved any different outcome.
• Petain
  • France’s second Army, six weeks before Verdun, had been relieved by the British and were held in general reserve
  • Upon appointment, Petain was found in a hotel with a woman. His staff captain knew his bachelor habits and found him at 3a
  • Petain was imposing and had an aristocratic air, but he was born a common man and disdained pomp and circumstance and parliamentary men.
  • He swam against the current of the offensive Grandmaisons, which was likely his reason for slow advancement. He would have retired in obscurity if not for the outbreak of war and the failure of plan XVII
  • Petain was a man loved by his soldiers. Because he had spent so much of his career in lower ranks than other generals at the time, he felt for his men, knew the importance of small changes, and had a remarkable ability to take a soldiers perspective. He never put his men forward in senseless attacks, always knowing when to stop. He appreciate the advantage of defensive positions. And he learned from his and others mistakes.
• The take-over
  • Petain took over for Herr, and on the morning of his first day fell ill
  • The few roads into Verdun had long been neglected and were rendered unusable due to the enemy after the attack. A single road that connected Verdun to Bar-le-Duc provided the critical artery to move immense amounts of supplies and ammunition into Verdun. Petain worked with Major Richard, head of transportation to Verdun, to ensure the roadway was constantly used and maintained. Armies wild march on the side of the road and inky motorwd vehicles were permitted. Territorials dug, repaired, and maintained the icy and then muddy road to ensure the flow of goods in and out did not stop. For it to stop would be a death wish
  • It was called Voie Sacree
  • Finally, on the 27th, the German Army made no advances. Petain had orchestrated the artillery to be used effectively, and inspired enough morale to stiffen the line
• Reappraisals
  • For all of the French issues, they Germans had their hands full as well. The attack had slowed as heavy gun movement was near impossible across the muddy terrain
  • Reserves and reinforcements were not forthcoming, and losses had been heavy. Falkenhayn, remember, wished to turn this into a trap and so advancement may have sprung it too early
  • Military historians, the crown prince, and the creator of Verdun de rivieres himself said the left bank was the weak spot for Verdun. But Falkenhayn resisted calls to add troops there
  • Le Mort Homme was important due to its vantage point and ability to fire upon other guns in the area. It was nearly taken on the 7th via the Bois de Corbeaux, but retaken with a bayonet charge the next morning
  • The simultaneous attacks on the right and the left were stymied, and the lines like the surface of water at boiling point constantly changing states. The town of Vaux was said to have changed hands 13 times throughout March
• The Mort Homme
  • Thousands and thousands of men died in an oscillating back-and-forth over this hill. There were no trenches left
  • The German advantage on the left bank was dwindling for the same reason the attack on the right bank - the French pounded their right flank with heavy guns. The French had placed guns on hill 304, a twin hill to Le Mort Homme to help repel the assaults. The Germans decided they must take that hill as well.
  • After failed assaults from the northeast, an assault from the west, from the outer edges of the French salient, found success. The 11th Barvarian division penetrated through heavy French defenses, mostly due to the lack of morale and high desertion rates
  • After months of brutal, attritional fighting, the Germans finally captured both hills in May, beginning with a titanic bombardment of hill 304
• The Air Battle
  • The infantry held some envy about the airmen. Even though there chances of survival were less than a machine gunner, their death was seen by thousands and the story a glorious one
  • French planes were numerous in models and generally inferior to German planes
  • Prior to Verdun, most air combat was solitary and gentlemanly; at Verdun, single flyer tactics became more toward an air force and a mass of flyers
  • Marquis de Rose assembled six out of France’s 15 fighter squadrons for Verdun, comprised of young, dashing and skilled airplane pilots. They were the famous Groupe des Cigognes (Storks)
  • Air superiority oscillated between the Germans and the French. First the French, than the Germans, than the French. Air superiority materially impacted ground success.
  • The LaFayette Squadron was comprised of American volunteers flying under the French flag, and help emotionally prime the public for America’s entry into the war
• The Crown Prince
  • The Crown Prince became annoyed at Falkenhayn’s indecision, and blamed some of the losses in the first few months on his reluctance to provide reserves and fully commit. Perhaps it’s because their objectives were not aligned, for the Crown Prince wanted to take Verdun while Falkenhayn wanted it to be a killing field.
  • On April 21st, the Crown Prince believed that the expense of soldiers would be a futile waste, because his objective would not be supported by Falkenhayn. However, his optimistic chief of staff Knobelsdorf disagreed. Even though he was the most subordinate of Falkenhayn, the Crown Prince and himself, he had a most forceful personality and had been in authority positions over the other two in previous roles.
  • In May 8th, an accidental explosion without Fort Douaumont killed 650 Germans
  • The Crown Prince, while head of an army and in command at Verdun, was inexperienced. He was smart, a quick learner, and had an understanding an appreciation for things, unlike his father. But he was inexperienced and had not earned his command through merit. His own father undercut him and told him to follow Knobelsdorf’s lead. And thus, even with his inclination that fighting at Verdun should stop, he had to yield to his chief of staff
• The Triumvirate
  • There was much disagreement between Joffre and Petain: Joffre hopes to push on the offensive at Verdun and prepare for a large Anglo-French offensive in the spring while Petain hoped to play defense at Verdun and rotate troops in and out quickly, arguing that any offensive moves would require larger numbers
  • In cane Nivelle, a confident and talented general who could also disarm and woo politicians
  • Nivelle was paired with Mangin the Butcher, one of the most tactically capable generals of France, and his chief of staff, Major d’Alenson, a nan with a terminal illness was and a brilliant officer
• May Cup
  • I loved the opening of this chapter
  • The failed French assault to retake fort Douaumont reinvigorated the German command, Falkenhayn himself, to continue with the attack. Out of that came the May Cup offensive, as large in size as the February 21st offensive but over half the width of front with the intent to capture Fort Vaux and surrounding areas as a jumping off point for Verdun itself
• Fort Vaux
  • The fort had been stripped of any guns and its single 75 by Joffre earlier in the war. It was equipped with a few machine guns
  • After taking points to the north and northwest of Vaux, the Germans swarmed the fort, attempting to overpower with sheer numbers
  • Water in the front ran out during the days of the siege
  • Commander Raynal was put in charge prior to the German attack, and the fort was woefully unprepared
  • Raynal was trapped inside the bottom of the fort along with a few officers and a garrison of men. They could signal another fort, Souville, through Morse code. Nivelle promised a counter-attack after an escapee from Vaux Informed him of the situation, but it amounted to almost nothing
  • Raynal, after 7 days of thirst, desperation and abandonment, surrendered to the Germans and would spend the next two and a half years in a prison camp with his men
• Danger signals
  • The Germans pressed on, capturing points in an attempt to prepare to capture Souville, the last fort needed to launch an attack on Verdun
  • The situation drew increasingly dire for the French, with Joffre concentrated on the spring Somme offensive and nivelle understating the severity. Petain continued to sound the alarm to mostly no avail. The situation was especially bad in early-mid June, from the 8th to the 12th. Nivelle had no troops in reserve
  • It was at this time that cracks began to grow bigger for Joffre. Rumblings began about the unhappiness the government had with Verdun
• The Secret Enemies
  • Lack of coordination could be partially blamed for the poor performance of the Central Powers in the war. Falkenhayn and Conrad, the Austrian counterpart of Germany’s military leader, rarely met and when they did their opposite personalities and backgrounds led to a difference of opinions
  • In an escalating back-and-forth of petty offenses, a trend emerged where each leader would keep the other in the dark about this or that, eventually leading to entire offensives being hidden from one another - including Verdun. Innocuous requests for troop control or reserves were increasingly denied, and the situation led to a spiteful Austrian attack on Italy to lash back at the lack of notice about Verdun, resulting in Russian gains in the Brusilov offensive and the near falling of the Austro-German line
• The Crisis
  • The Germans unleashed Phosgene gas, a new type of gas that was supposed to permeate the French gas masks. They launched them in late June as they fought toward Fort Souville vis the town of Fleury. They made large games, concentrating their forces and pushing forward. Morale was low on the French side
  • Even with the gains, the Germans had once again made the error of attacking on too narrow a front. It was a brilliant success but didn’t break the French lines completely.
  • There was a lack of water, and thirst was a real menace to further success. Further, there was not enough manpower to exploit weak French lines. There was not enough phosgene gas remaining to try a further attack
  • The French urged the British to move up their planned summer offensive. The British went forward with the Somme, which pulled troops and guns away from Verdun
• Falkenhayn Dismissed
  • In a last ditch effort, the Germans pushed an offensive again. Fort Souville was actually reached by Germans, by a ragtag group of 30 soldiers split from their group after being pushed forward by French bombardment. Quickly, a group of Frenchmen within the fort repelled them
  • With that, the hope of Verdun was lost for the Germans
  • The French lost 275000 men, with 70k killed; the Germans, 250,000
  • Falkenhayn still went back and forth on his decision to take up defensive positions at Verdun or to attack again. The crown prince was aghast and pleaded with his father to remove his chief of staff Knobelsdorf, as he felt he was influencing Falkenhayn.
  • Falkenhayn was finally let go after Romania entered the war on the allied side in August; Falkenhayn had guaranteed Romania wouldn’t join the war until after the harvests in mid-September
• Counter strikes
  • In forward position, with reservations about continuing placing resources into the battle, the German morale was low and the involvement half-hearted
  • Petain, Nivelle and Mangin planned meticulously for a counter-offensive with an intent to recapture Douaumont.
  • In October, the French attacked from Souville and reclaimed all of the land and the fort. They utilized heavy 400 guns, not previously used in the battle
  • The offensive was also one of the first times the creeping barrage was used, which was instructed by Nivelle
  • Later, Fort Vaux was retaken after it was partially abandoned and destroyed by the Germans
  • With the reclaiming of the forts, Nivelle was promoted in the public and press as the new French war hero
  • With that, the battle was technically over
• The New Leader
  • The swell against Joffre as the third winter of the war approach broke, and he was removed. It was obvious his lack of preparedness and attention for Verdun, and his focus, the Somme, was another allies failure
  • Petain (for his anti-government stances and asides), Foch (for his failure on the Somme), and Castelnau were passed over for Petain’s report, Nivelle. Nivelle could woo politians, and was recently the hero of Verdun. He was also a marked leader of the Grandmaison spirit
  • The Nivelle offensives in April 1917 were disasterous. 120,000 casualties over two days. Medical services were severely unprepared. Soldiers began bleating like sheep. Soldiers became virulently opposed to war.
  • The French mutinies are shrouded in mystery. It is tough to tell their scope. However, Nivelle was sacked and Petain brought in. He made simple adjustments such as properly organizing leave, setting up station canteens, proper sleeping and hygiene arrangements, and sending cooks off to be trained. His troops trusted him to not waste their lives. He visited nearly all the divisions in person to quell fears and tell them they simply must wait for the Americans.
  • Here Petain gave his most to the French army. However, while it was repaired it’s spirit was utterly changed. No longer could it fight a Verdun it have the willpower it once had.
• Aftermath
  • Verdun could be called the most terrible battle. It did not have the same casualties as the Somme but the proportion of casualties to the numbers engaged was notably higher than any other battle, as well as the number of dead to the area of the battle field. No battle has lasted as long.
  • France’s losses were 377,231 with 162,308 dead or missing (taken prisoner)
  • Germany’s losses were 337,000 and 100,000 dead or missing (taken prisoner).
  • In total, in months even after the battle, 1.25m dead or gassed or wounded
  • No one quite won the battle. The French regained lost territory but the sacrifice was immense. For German, their death trap was unsuccessful, taking as many German casualties as French. The opportunity cost was also high for German, when they could have focus on the eastern front or elsewhere
  • Falkenhayn could not commit to a single concentration, preferring “no risk” offensives and the attrition strategy (which could only work for the allies).
  • The battle sowed the seeds for mutinies in the French Army
  • It was an indecisive battle in an indecisive war